Appendices to ‘Fatal error: Who is winning in the war between Russia and Ukraine?’?

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: REFERENCES

[0622]: Theory of Victory, Turkey and Russian mobilization

• [0622a] https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/how-wars-end and https://www.amazon.com/Between-War-Peace-America-Ends/dp/1439194610 and https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Echevarria/APSTRAT1.htm#:~:text=Clausewitz%20derived%20his%20proposition%20that,and%20tactical%20levels%20of%20war.
• [0622b] https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/where-turkey-stands-russia-ukraine-war
• [0622c] https://english.elpais.com/international/2022-05-31/russia-boosts-recruitment-campaign-in-fresh-step-towards-war-mobilization.html

[0626] Data Visualisation and Area Occupied

• [0626a] https://twitter.com/MaxCRoser/status/1500129718649118727 and https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1500113886070071303.html

[0703] Peter Zeihan on Ukraine

• [0703a] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wfm3_8lCY1M&list=UUsy9I56PY3IngCf_VGjunMQ&index=6

[0704] Polling and Surveys I

• [0704a] https://wapor.org/wp-content/uploads/Release-Sapiens_eng.pdf and https://sapiens.com.ua/en/publication-single-page?id=224 and https://sapiens.com.ua/publications/socpol-research/224/Present_war_telegram_eng.pdf
• [0704b] https://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_ua_international_1200_ua_062022_%D1%85____press.pdf and https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/trinadcatyy_obschenacionalnyy_opros_vneshnepoliticheskie_orientacii_18-19_iyunya_2022.html
• [0704c] https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/specialnaja-voennaja-operacija-monitoring-20223006

[0718] Polling and Surveys II

• [0718a] How much attention does your government dedicate to the war in Ukraine compared to other problems its own citizens are facing? https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/06/16/europeans-divided-over-how-ukraine-war-should-play-out-reveals-poll and https://ecfr.eu/publication/peace-versus-justice-the-coming-european-split-over-the-war-in-ukraine/ and https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/peace-versus-justice-the-coming-european-split-over-the-war-in-ukraine.pdf
• [0718b] To what extent have the following events in the past month mattered to voters personally: https://mobile.twitter.com/RedfieldWilton/status/1543596090943049728 and https://nitter.net/RedfieldWilton/status/1538525775934242816
• [0718c]: How much do you think what happens in the Russia-Ukraine conflict matters to life in

the United States? https://www.foxnews.com/official-polls/fox-news-poll-six-ten-favor-u-s-provide-aid-ukraine https://static.foxnews.com/foxnews.com/content/uploads/2022/06/Fox_June-10-13-2022_National_Topline_June-16-Release.pdf https://static.foxnews.com/foxnews.com/content/uploads/2022/06/Fox_June-10-13-2022_National_Cross-Tabs_June-16-Release.pdf

[0719] Polling and Surveys III

• [0719a] https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2022/06/20/war-ukraine-britons-continue-support-sanctions-are and https://docs.cdn.yougov.com/9mofxvnhr2/YouGov%20-%20Ukraine%20Conflict%20June%202022.pdf and https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2022/03/18/support-further-russian-sanctions-and-arms-ukraine and https://docs.cdn.yougov.com/9mofxvnhr2/YouGov%20-%20Ukraine%20Conflict%20June%202022.pdf
• [0719b] https://www.foxnews.com/official-polls/fox-news-poll-six-ten-favor-u-s-provide-aid-ukraine and https://static.foxnews.com/foxnews.com/content/uploads/2022/06/Fox_June-10-13-2022_National_Topline_June-16-Release.pdf and https://static.foxnews.com/foxnews.com/content/uploads/2022/06/Fox_June-10-13-2022_National_Cross-Tabs_June-16-Release.pdf
• [0719c] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3756 or https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_22_3756/IP_22_3756_EN.pdf or https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2694 or https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/api/deliverable/download/file?deliverableId=82054
• [0719d] https://morningconsult.com/tracking-the-russia-ukraine-crisis/

[0720] Subdivisions of Ukraine I

• [0720a] https://samf.substack.com/p/can-ukraine-win?sd=pf
• [0720b] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l0h5Wdbu2bM
• [0720c] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_hromadas_of_Ukraine
• [0720d] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Sievierodonetsk_(2022)
• [0720e] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Lysychansk
• [0720f] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hromada
• [0720g] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raions_of_Ukraine
• [0720h] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control_of_cities_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War
• [0720i] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Russo-Ukrainian_War_detailed_map

[0727] Warfare Assessment

• [0727a] Examples include:
  • [0727aa] “Commander’s Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution”, see https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pams_hands/assessment_hbk.pdf
  • [0727ab] “Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-0”, see https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-0/3-0-D27-OPS-Assessment-Measure.pdf
  • [0727ac] “Measuring the Effectiveness of Special Operations”, see https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2504.html and https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2500/RR2504/RAND_RR2504.pdf
  • [0727ad] “Allied Joint Publication-3.27 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Insurgency”, see https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1082608/20220504-AJP_3_27_A_COIN.pdf
  • [0727ae] “ Assessing Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Intelligence Analysis”, see https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG668.pdf
• [0727b] https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/development-concepts-and-doctrine-centre
• [0727c] Examples include
  • [0727ca] “Performance measurement in military operations: information versus incentives”, see https://faculty.nps.edu/ljblanke/docs/DPE%20metrics%20Blanken%20Lepore.pdf
  • [0727cb] “Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success and Failure” (Blanken, Rothstein, Lepore et al, 2015), see https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt19qgffn and https://www.waterstones.com/book/assessing-war/leo-j-blanken/hy-rothstein/9781626162457
• [0727d] https://web.mit.edu/~dcltdw/AOW/4.html

[0801] Polling and Surveys IV

[0802] Polling and Surveys V

[0803] Polling and Surveys VI

[0804] Polling and Surveys VII

[0805] Polling and Surveys VIII

[0806] Subdivisions of Ukraine II

• [0806a] = https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_hromadas_of_Ukraine
• [0806b] = all entries in [0806d] with “Категорія об’єкта” set to “H”, except for those in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, all of which have a first-level code of “UA01000000000013043”
• [0806c] = https://www.minregion.gov.ua/napryamki-diyalnosti/rozvytok-mistsevoho-samovryaduvannya/administratyvno/kodyfikator-administratyvno-terytorialnyh-odynycz-ta-terytorij-terytorialnyh-gromad/
• [0806d] = The website is here: https://www.minregion.gov.ua/napryamki-diyalnosti/rozvytok-mistsevoho-samovryaduvannya/administratyvno/kodyfikator-administratyvno-terytorialnyh-odynycz-ta-terytorij-terytorialnyh-gromad/kodyfikator-administratyvno-terytorialnyh-odynycz-ta-terytorij-terytorialnyh-gromad-2021-03-22/ and the spreadsheet is here: https://www.minregion.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/kodyfikator-2.xlsx
• [0806e] = all entries in [0806d] with “Категорія об’єкта” set to “H”
• [0806f] = all entries in [0806d] with “Категорія об’єкта” set to “H” and the first-level code set to“UA01000000000013043” for those in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
• [0806g] = https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/rada/show/v0290914-20#Text

[0807] Polling and Surveys IX

[0808] Polling and Surveys X

[0809] Polling and Surveys X

[0810] Polling and Surveys XI

[0811] Clausewitzian Gap and Grand Strategy Gap

• [0811a], Von Clausewitz was a 19th century Prussian military theorist, famous for his book “On War”. The “Clausewitzian gap” was named after von Clausewitz by Blanken and Lepore in Chapter 1 of “Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success and Failure” and by Rothstein in Chapter 2
• [0811b] YouGov and Ipsos both asked questions about support for Ukraine taking energy prices into account. But they were noticeably different. On investigation it was discovered that YouGov was inconsistent with its wording. Ipsos asked about an “increase in energy prices”, but YouGov used different wording, sometimes using the phrase “significant increase”, sometimes “increase”. See https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2022/07/19/britons-tend-support-keeping-russia-sanctions-face
• [0811c] See “On War”, Book 8 section B “War is an instrument of policy”, specifically “war is only a branch of political activity; that it is in no sense autonomous” (page 252), and “in the same way as a man who has not fully mastered a foreign language sometimes fails to express himself correctly, so statement often issues orders that defeat the purpose they are meant to serve” (page 256) and “unless statesman and soldier are combined in one person, the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet, so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities.” (also page 256). Page numbers are from the Oxford World’s Classics version, ISBN 978-0-19-954002-0

[1123] Polling and Surveys XII

[1124] Polling and Surveys XIII

[1125] Polling and Surveys XIV

See also

[1126] Polling and Surveys XV

[1127] Polling and Surveys XVI

[1127e] Polling and Surveys XVII

The Russian sources Chronicles, Republic and ExtremeScan made references to each other and the data stored on GitHub at https://github.com/dorussianswantwar/ . Consequently the citation [1127e] was used to cite sources from all three locations.

[1208] Polling and Surveys XVIII

[1211] UK and Ukranian Gazettes

• [1211a] https://www.thegazette.co.uk/about
• [1211b] https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/main/o1290

APPENDIX 2: SECOND-LEVEL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS OF UKRAINE

To a first approximation countries are subdivided into first-level administrative divisions, which are in turn subdivided into second-level administrative divisions. Examples of these are:

Table: examples of administration divisions and settlement

A recurring worldwide problem with second-level divisions is their inconsistency. They may not have constant names, may not have constant borders, or may not have consistent titles (Nunavut is a territory but Alberta is a province). So even in normal circumstances compiling a list of the second-level administrative divisions of Ukraine would be complicated.

But these are not normal circumstances. There are further complexities as follows;

• Ukraine does not have consistent titles. It uses the word “oblast” for most of its first-level divisions but “city of special status” for two of them: Kyiv and Sevastopol. It uses the word “raion” for most of its second-level divisions but the subdivisions of each “city of special status” are called “urban districts” or “urban raions” or “city districts” or “city raions” or “districts” or “raions”
• Ukraine reorganized its second-level divisions in 2020 and sources may not be up-to-date.
• Many areas are contested between Russia and Ukraine thru force of arms.
• Russia may have its own names for areas and/or have different borders or subdivisions.
• Original names given to second-level divisions will be in Ukrainian or Russian, so English equivalents must be found. Those English names may be created via transliteration or translation, and they give different results.
• Other Russia/Ukraine differences.

Consequently a second-level division may have several different names depending on when the source was written and which jurisdiction it was using. An example is:

Table: various names used for subdivision UA85000000000259923 in Crimea named after Yuri Gagarin

To write this article it was necessary to list each second-level division and assign a name to them. But given the circumstances it was difficult to do so in a way to satisfy all parties, and assigning a definitive name is obviously outside the scope of this article. It is inevitable therefore that the names assigned herein may contain errors and omissions, or not match the names in Ukraine or Russian law, or not match those used by the local inhabitants. The reader should bear this in mind.

Accordingly we will divide Ukraine into 150 second-level administrative divisions. This is made up of the 136 raions as defined in 2020, plus the ten urban districts of Kyiv, plus the four urban districts of Sevastopol. Note that many of these will be controlled and administered by Russia or its allies, such as Crimea which is currently controlled by Russia and annexed into the Russian Federation as the republic of Crimea. Those 150 divisions are as follows:

Table: 150 second-level administrative divisions used for this article

• (udK)[1] = urban district of Kyiv
• [2] = https://directory.org.ua/territories/X, where “X” is the code, eg https://directory.org.ua/territories/UA80000000000093317
• [3] = urban district of Sevastapol
• [4] = City with special status or federal city depending on which legal framework you choose

APPENDIX 3: THIRD-LEVEL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS OF UKRAINE

In 2020 the Ukranian Government reorganized its third-level administrative subdivisions. The list of the resultant subdivisions were codified by the “Кодифікатор адміністративно-територіальних одиниць та територій територіальних громад”, which in English is the “Codifier of administrative-territorial units and territories of territorial communities”. Each subdivision in that codifier has a unique code, known as the КАТОТТГ ID or KATOTTH ID depending on alphabet.

Each individual code can be looked up via the Ukrainian govt website at https://directory.org.ua , for example https://directory.org.ua/territories/UA01020000000022387. But we didn’t need an individual lookup, we needed a full list.

That full list of all the codes in the codifier can be found in a Ukrainian government spreadsheet which is periodically updated. That spreadsheet is known as the “kodyfikator”, and the successive versions of that spreadsheet are available here[0806c]. We took the version of 2022/03/22, which can be found here[0806d].

Each entry in that “kodyficator” are given an object category (“Категорія об’єкта”). We wanted to extract the third-level subdivisions, which have an object category of “H”. But since they didn’t cover Kyiv and Sevastopol, we also took the urban districts of Kyiv and Sevastopol, which have a code of “B”

Table: object categories for hromadas “H” and urban districst of Kyiv and Sevastopol “B”

The resultant list of 1,786 subdivisions we will use looks like this:

Table: subdivisions we will use as third-level administrative divisions of Ukraine

That list is too large to be included in a Word document and can be found in an accompanying Excel document.

APPENDIX 4: OPINION POLLS ON/BEFORE JUNE 2022

This is a selection of opinion polls before June 2022

Table: Opinion Polls on/before June 2022

APPENDIX 5: OPINION POLLS JUNE TO JULY 2022

This is a selection of opinion polls for approximately June to July 2022.

Table: Opinion Polls after June 2022

APPENDIX 6: PLAUSIBILITY CHECK 1: CHANGES FROM MAY 6 TO JUL 3

The first version of this article was written in July 2022. But with respect to the question “who is winning”, the figures were counter-intuitive and we needed to check whether the metric of merit has succeeded or failed. The metric said that at the time of writing (July 2022) pro-Russian forces were advancing but very slowly at the rate of ~2/1000ths per month. But the news coverage in new and old media listed the movement of pro-Russian forces with some considerable detail and drama, focusing on the massive damage in materiel and casualties both military and civilian, implying that the Russians were falling back. Was our metric of merit failing?

To find out we performed two plausibility checks. Below is the first.

As a first plausibility check the author looked at the twin cities of Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk in the Luhansk Raion, about half the size of the similar Newcastle and Gateshead in the UK. The 2022 Battle of Sievierodonetsk started about May 6^th and the Battle of Lysychansk ended around July 3^rd two months later, at which point Ukrainian forces ceded the field. But Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk occupy approx two hromadas, which gives us a grindingly slow occupation rate of about a third of the Sievierodonetsk Raion over two months, which is ~1/1000ths of pre-2014 Ukraine per month.

This is compatible with our rate of ~2/1000ths per month and our metric of merit has passed the first plausibility check.

APPENDIX 7: PLAUSIBILITY CHECK 2: CHANGES FROM JUN 26 TO JUL 24

The first version of this article was written in July 2022. But with respect to the question “who is winning”, the figures were counter-intuitive and we needed to check whether the metric of merit has succeeded or failed. The metric said that at the time of writing (July 2022) pro-Russian forces were advancing but very slowly at the rate of ~2/1000ths per month. But the news coverage in new and old media listed the movement of pro-Russian forces with some considerable detail and drama, focusing on the massive damage in materiel and casualties both military and civilian, implying that the Russians were falling back. Was our metric of merit failing?

To find out we performed two plausibility checks. Below is the second.

As a second plausibility check the author looked at the changes in the front line between June 26 and July 24 by taking screenshots of liveuamap.com and comparing them. Despite the reports regarding Kharkiv and west of Donetsk, the line on the map in those areas had not visibly changed. The two places which did show visible changes were around Sievierodonetsk and Kherson, and we discuss them below.

The Area Around Kherson

When examining Kherson we noted that pro-Ukrainian forces had recaptured a small amount of Kherson territory over the period, as shown below.

Table: comparison by area between June 26 2022 and July 24 2022 around Kherson

Translating the screenshots above into hromadas we see this:

Table: comparison by hromada between June 26 2022 and July 24 2022 around Kherson

So the change in territory over the period was constrained to within the hromada Stanislavska (UA6510013). So from the point of view of raions and hromadas there was no actual change.

The Area Around Sievierodonetsk

When examining Sievierodonetsk we noted that pro-Russian forces during the period had captured some territory to the west and south, and there was minor change near Svitlodars’k, as shown below.

Table: comparison by area between June 26 2022 and July 24 2022 around Sievierodonetsk

Translating the screenshots above into hromadas we see this:

Table: comparison by hromada between June 26 2022 and July 24 2022 around Sievierodonetsk

There is no change in raions and when translated into hromadas the change is surprisingly minor: only three hromadas have been entered by pro-Russian forces that did not already have them. They are Lysychanska (UA4412005), Siverska (UA1402007) and Zvanivska (UA1402003).

Conclusion

If we assume that liveuamap.com is accurate then pro-Russians have only gained three hromadas between June 26^th and July 24^th 2022. To put this in perspective pre-2014 Ukraine had approximately 1780 hromadas (2020 version), depending how you treat Kyiv and Sevastopol. So that means they gained 3/1780 = 1.6/1000ths of pre-2014 Ukraine between June 26^th and July 24^th 2022.

This is compatible with our rate of ~2/1000ths per month and our metric of merit has passed the second plausibility check.

APPENDIX 8: DISCUSSION OF AMBIGUOUS ISSUES

When writing this article certain issues were raised. Most were resolved, at least to the author’s satisfaction. But some of them could have been resolved differently, and we discuss them below.

One Article Or Two

This article should have been two: one laying down the theoretical basis for the metrics, and another applying them to the Russo-Ukraine War. But it was originally planned as something smaller which then grew as research expanded and the war progressed. Had the extent of both been known at the beginning then it could and perhaps should have been split, but it was not.

Raions Vs Hromada Vs Area Occupied

Once “area occupied” was selected as the metric of merit, a tension was created about the level of granularity. A coarse granularity such as using the second-level raions was quicker to compile and more objective as it could cope with fine movements in the battle line. But this lack of responsivity meant that it could only give a “big picture” and not capture the day-to-day changes. A finer level of granularity was attempted by using the third-level hromadas, but the leap from 150 raions to 1786 hromadas made it impossible to compile the figures in a timely manner. Greater IT skills would have enabled the use of hromadas and even down to the much finer granularity of area occupied in square kilometers, but these were not available to the author at the time. So we selected raions.

Was this correct decision? The author believes yes, as the metric absorbed minor changes and only showed significant ones, thereby giving the “big picture” required. But an insatiable public wanting day-to-day discussion of finer movements would have not have been satisfied with that.

Russian Polling

As the author wrote this article a nagging doubt emerged: how reliable was the Russian polling? The 21^st century Russian Federation is not the 20^th century Soviet Union and it has access to modern polling techniques. Nevertheless, phenomena such as differential non-response/self-selection bias and social satisficing/social response bias exist in the Western world and presumably would manifest in Putin’s Russia to a similar extent if not more so.

Apparently these phenomena do exist in Russian opinion polling, with some people selecting themselves out of polling by not responding[1208a] and those who do respond are affected by conformism, the propensity of respondents to defer to authority[1208b]. But there is also the counterargument that these phenomena also manifested before the February invasion and have not noticeably changed since,[1208b] and that the effect of international tensions, the growing pressure on Russia from Western countries, and the introduction of Western sanctions is to create a rally-round-the-flag effect, [1208b] with Russians seeking out official sources to bolster their belief and deprecating internet sources that contradict this narrative. [1208b]

So even taking into effect the different values (we chose levada.ru, wciom.ru and the extremescan trend figures) it appears that the Russian opinion polling may accurately reflect, in relative movement if not in absolute magnitude, the support of the Russian people for the war.

APPENDIX 9: DERIVATION OF AREA OCCUPIED

How did we calculate the areas occupied? It came down to two sources.

Liveuamap.com (unofficial)

We chose liveuamap.com as the source for the unofficial assessment. This was not because it was the best, and it often disagreed with other sources such as https://deepstatemap.live/ or https://www.understandingwar.org/ . But the DeepState map only went back as far as April and the UnderstandingWar source was either zoomable but archiveless or archived but unzoomable. Since the Liveuamap was zoomable and easily accessible, going back as far as February and creating its own archive as it went, we selected it.

The Liveuamap was examined for ten timepoints between February and November inclusive. Each timepoint was the first Sunday after the 24^th of each month. The selected links for each timepoint are:

Table: liveuamap.com sources for area occupied

The resultant graph fulfilled the requirements of area occupied and an expanded version covering the period to the end of July 2023 was selected for Part 10.

Minre.gov.ua (official)

The Ukrainian state has a Ministry devoted to the governance of those areas of Ukraine with pro-Russian forces present. It is called the “Ministry Of Reintegration Of Temporary Occupied Territories Of Ukraine” ( “Міністерство З Питань Реінтеграції Тимчасово Окупованих Територій України” in Ukrainian). Periodically that Ministry issues reports[1211b] and some of those reports list those oblasts/raions/hromadas are occupied by pro-Russian forces, and those reports are published online.

The reports were examined for ten timepoints between February and November inclusive. Each timepoint was the first Sunday after the 24^th of each month. The selected links for each timepoint are:

Table: zakon.rada.gov.ua sources for area occupied

Unfortunately, when displayed as a graph it became apparent that this would not meet our requirements. To explain why, consider the graph below.

Table: graph of zakon.rada.gov.ua document z0453-22 for area occupied

It appears that this metric does include some areas where pro-Russian forces are not present (eg encircled raions) and does not include some areas where pro-Russian are present (eg where they are just “passing thru” and not engaged). Consequently, we categorized this metric as a measure of performance (possibly a measure of effectiveness?) and included it as such in Part 6.

APPENDIX 10: THE POSITION OF MS. INNA VOLOSEVYCH

The author ran an early version of this article past the staff of “Info Sapiens”, a research agency based in Kyiv, Ukraine that specializes in research, surveys and analysis. One that replied was a Ms. Inna Volosevych. Ms. Volosevych disagreed with the use of the directional polls from ratinggroup.ua to assess Ukrainian public approval for the direction of Ukraine and preferred a more detailed approach. As the author wanted to directly compare the numbers to the Russian equivalents that option was not chosen, but the point was noted. Ms. Volosevych’s email is excerpted below

On Sunday, 6 November 2022 at 08:48:20 GMT, Inna Volosevych [email redacted] wrote:

Dear Martyn,

I will respond when I carefully read the article, but as a sociologist, I have first of all looked at the tables. It’s not relevant to take the right/wrong direction question as an indication of Ukrainian’s willingness to fight as it’s ambiguous: on the one hand, we believe we move toward victory and that’s the right direction, on the other hand, it’s weird to name war as the right direction.

You can use this data instead – the left column is the poll of September 9-11 and the right is the poll of July 21-24. If the question is about territories occupied in 2022 we would probably receive 100%

APPENDIX 11: OPINION POLL FIGURES FOR RUSSIAN SUPPORT

Table: Opinion poll figures for Russian support for the special military operation

APPENDIX 12: OPINION POLL FIGURES FOR UKRAINIAN SUPPORT

Table: Opinion poll figures for Ukrainian support for the direction of Ukraine

The dip in support in [0810n] may be artefactual as it was in the “resilience”/”СТІЙКОСТІ” series, unlike the others which were in the “national survey”/”загальнонаціональне опитування” series. Nevertheless it was the latest survey in June 2023.

APPENDIX 13: OPINION POLL FIGURES FOR BRITISH SUPPORT

Table: how much does the Ukraine Conflict matter to you?

Table: how much do you support the following options (cost not specified)

Table: how much do you support the following (cost specified, eg greater cost of living/energy prices)

* YouGov’s questions regarding support in relation to energy prices was not consistent. In March and Jun 2022 YouGov asked “significant increase in energy prices”, then just “increase in energy prices” in July, except for the Euro wave questions. This is presumably why the YouGov and Ipsos numbers differ. See https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2022/07/19/britons-tend-support-keeping-russia-sanctions-face

* “COL” = cost of living.

APPENDIX 14: SANITY CHECK

As a last minute sanity check, the graph of the metric of merit was compared visually to those prepared by the blogger “war_mapper” (see https://nitter.net/War_Mapper/). Both mine and their maps agreed that, at least in terms of land taken and regained, the war was at August 2022 stalemated

• https://nitter.net/War_Mapper/status/1686417006734594048#m
• https://nitter.net/War_Mapper/status/1686417004293464064#m
• https://nitter.net/War_Mapper/status/1686417009183973376#m